ABSTRACT: Many accounting firms have changed the way their auditors evaluate internal control. Instead of preparing flowcharts documenting transaction flows, they only document the controls that have a bearing on specific financial statement assertions. This shift in documentation marks a change in the structure of the internal control evaluation task from transaction flow to control objective. This case presents documentation organized by control objective for internal control of a company's purchasing cycle. The case includes discussion and objective format questions and is relatively short, which means it can be used as an in-class or out-of-class exercise or an in-class testing or assessment device on internal control evaluation.
training. When program changes occur that may affect current procedures or report usage by regional personnel, detailed documentation accompanies the diskette.
Control Objectives for Purchasing Authorization
At NYCCC, the computer equipment is housed in a locked suite of rooms with one main door, which is secured by keypad access. Approximately 50 people have authority to enter the facility.
Access control software on the mainframe computer at NYCCC allows security levels to be specified for each program and data file, as well as classes of files. Sensitive system management files are restricted to only those specifically identified for access, while access to all other files is restricted to particular user departments (indicated by userid.) Quarterly reviews are performed by the IS Director of Security to evaluate each user's need to access data and programs. Internal audit performs a similar review annually.
Access to the regional office computers, which are located beside the administrator's desk, is controlled by passwords on the main system menu. Passwords are given only to authorized personnel.
Any office in the company can complete a Purchase Order (PO) and send it (mail or fax) to a preapproved vendor. The ordering office must send a copy of the PO to the accounts payable clerk at the regional office.
Checks are printed at NYCCC every weekday evening. The IOC Supervisor runs the signature machine and monitors the mailing of checks.
Accuracy
Upon receiving a PO, the accounts payable clerk in the regional office enters it into a PO database maintained at the regional office. Each time the clerk enters a vendor number, inventory item number, and expected receipt date, the system retrieves the vendor name and item description. When a vendor number or an inventory item number does not exist in the database, the clerk enters it.
All vendors mail their invoices to the regional office. Upon receiving a vendor's invoice, the accounts payable clerk locates the PO in the PO database, compares the quantity billed on the invoice to the quantity recorded as received, and compares the price to the PO unit price. Discrepancies are investigated and corrected through a telephone call or fax to the administrative person in the local office. The payment due date is entered into the PO database only after all discrepancies are cleared.
Validity
When shipments arrive at the local office that ordered the material, a warehouse receiving clerk or the administrative employee in the front office receives them. The person receiving the material marks the packing slip as received, and notes any changes in quantity based on inspection of the goods.
Local offices send each packing slip, serving as a receiving report, to the regional office. When a receiving report arrives at the regional office, the accounts payable clerk finds the purchase order in the PO database and records the quantity received for each line item in the online PO record. Discrepancies are corrected via telephone or fax communication with the local office.
Daily, an extraction program searches the PO database for untransmitted invoices for which payment due dates have been recorded. These newly completed records are transmitted to NYCCC and are marked in the PO database to prevent retransmission. From this point, the regional offices have no further responsibility for the invoices unless problems arise at NYCCC.
Completeness
At NYCCC, backups are performed daily for all data and program files modified that day. The previous two days' backups are kept in the computing center while the prior three days' backups are kept in remote storage. Complete system backups are performed monthly and the latest generation is kept in remote storage.
At each regional office, the administrator performs cassette tape backups at the end of every business day. The backup tapes are kept in the administrator's desk.
At NYCCC, the Input/Output Control (IOC) Group is responsible for company-wide Accounts Payable processing and check printing. The Accounts Payable system identifies the invoices to be paid on the next business day and prints a list of these for the IOC Group to review. If it is decided that any particular invoice should not be paid, IOC electronically marks the invoice as suspended and follows up with the regional office to resolve any problems. When discrepancies have been cleared for an invoice, the IOC Supervisor turns the transaction record's suspension flag off, releasing the record for the next day's processing. The list of suspended invoices is reviewed monthly by the IOC Supervisor to determine if any suspended invoices have failed to be released for payment. 
II. TEACHING NOTES Introduction and Purpose
Beginning with SAS No. 55 (AICPA 1988), financial auditors have been organizing their internal control judgments by audit objective to enable risk-based audits. This means auditors obtain a sufficient understanding of the state of the client's internal control to permit them to assess control risk in terms of financial statement assertions (AICPA 1996) . Risk-based auditing is consistent with effective auditing in an environment with increasing public demands for greater accountability from companies and their auditors and increasing use of information technology in accounting information systems (AIS). As the level of AIS automation continues and real-time access to corporate databases becomes a reality (Wallman 1997) , the evaluation of control risk in risk-based auditing will likely become even more important.
In the past, public accounting firms generally prepared extensive flowcharts of their clients' financial systems as a means of documenting internal control. The switch to risk-based auditing with its emphasis on assessing control risk has, however, prompted auditors to replace flowcharts with more easily prepared narratives organized by control objectives corresponding to financial statement assertions (Bierstaker 1996) . Not only does this approach focus on control objectives directly, but it also helps the auditor be more efficient because it avoids the need to prepare time-intensive flowcharts.
While flowcharts portray systems as a chronological sequence of processing steps representing transaction flows, control objective narratives are organized by controls pertaining to specific financial statement assertions and tend to be less inclusive. Because the shift to narratives has occurred recently, the text of many existing cases for internal control evaluation is organized by transaction flow rather than by control objective. For example, the widely used Dermaceutics case presents its cycle documentation (Coopers & Lybrand 1998, purchasing, 147-153; revenue, 185-190) in the form of flowcharts and accompanying explanations of the flowcharted steps in chronological order. The Dermaceutics case does, indeed, prompt students to organize their internal control evaluation by audit assertion, but they begin their evaluation with client system documentation organized by transaction flow rather than by control objective.
Because its text is organized by control objective, the internal control case presented here is consistent with the firms' shift to control objective narratives for internal control evaluation. It is readily usable in a classroom environment in a single class session, as an outside-of-class assignment, or as an assessment device.
But more important than the form of internal control documentation is the fact that the shift from flowcharts to narratives implies the need for a corresponding shift in auditor knowledge structure: from transaction flow to control objective. Research has found that auditors employing a knowledge structure different from that of the task structure exhibit diminished performance (Nelson et al. 1995) . Flowcharts imply a transaction flow knowledge structure, i.e., the organizing categories are the sequential subprocesses in a transaction cycle such as purchase order preparation and receiving in a purchasing cycle; narratives imply a control objective knowledge structure, i.e., the organizing categories are control objectives such as authorization or completeness of transactions as they apply to financial account balance assertions (Frederick 1991) . Less experienced auditors, however, exhibit weak control objective knowledge structure (Frederick et al. 1994) , and auditors appear to develop a control objective knowledge structure with experience (Libby and Frederick 1990; Tubbs 1992; Frederick et al. 1994; Curtis and Viator 1999) .
There is no reason why auditors should have to wait for experience to acquire a control objective knowledge structure. Conceivably, students could acquire this form of knowledge structure, which might help them develop audit expertise faster than they do now. Thus, accounting educators might be able to help their students become better auditors faster if they had more internal control cases organized by control objective to reinforce the control objective approach of audit textbooks (e.g., Arens and Loebbecke 1998; Robertson and Louwers 1999) . This case, Apex, is an example of this approach. Its narrative about the company's purchasing system is organized by control objectives, i.e., all information that pertains to the same control objective appears together.
Teaching Approaches
The case can be used in the following ways:
1. As an in-class or out-of-class exercise in understanding purchasing functions or evaluating internal control in a purchasing cycle 2. As a testing or assessment device for ascertaining students' proficiency in evaluating internal control
The case is suitable for use in courses in accounting information systems, computer auditing, and auditing. It can be used as the stimulus for answering the discussion questions, the multiple-choice questions, or both. Depending on the course, it might be appropriate to use subsets of the questions. A flowchart is included in the appendix for instructor reference or, at instructor discretion, for student use. 
Suggested Solution

Physical Access
Control over physical access to regional computers is very weak, which means that the information resources are vulnerable to removal or destruction. Because backup tapes are stored on-site only, regional staff might not be able to recover programs and data from intentional, accidental, or catastrophic damage. There is no backup/recovery plan, a significant weakness, which increases the likelihood of processing interruptions when the systems fail.
Physical access is somewhat more controlled at NYCCC, although too many people (50) have access to the computer room. Backup procedures are better too, although the number of days retained (two days on-site and five days at a remote location) is insufficient to allow staff to recover from some kinds of program and data damage. There is no backup/recovery plan, a significant weakness, which increases the likelihood of processing interruptions when the system fails.
Logical Access
Because there is only one password for all functions for a regional system and there is no password change control, almost anyone determined to do so could gain access to the system. This is a significant weakness.
Logical access control at NYCCC is much stronger because password control can be implemented independently for each program and data file on an individual or a departmental basis. Quarterly and annual reviews of access privileges ensure that access control is maintained, although some provision should be made for terminating access rights immediately for employees who leave the company. The case is silent on how well access control is implemented on a daily basis. In most companies this size, there would be a corporate security officer who enters passwords and designates file access privileges.
Physical and Logical Access. What new or improved control procedures would reduce or eliminate these weaknesses?
Regional Computer Systems. Regional computer security should be reviewed. It is likely that the review would indicate the need to store backup tapes off-site, to password protect individual applications, to designate a security officer to administer security provisions, and to develop a backup/ recovery plan. NYCCC Computer System. At NYCCC, a security officer should be designated to implement more restrictive access to the computer room, develop procedures for terminating password access for employees who leave the company, and review individual access privileges. A backup/recovery plan should be implemented at NYCCC. a. Although NYCCC users participate in system development during project selection, system design, and testing evaluation, regional users do not. This is a weakness that may lead to programs running on regional systems not being responsive to user needs.
b. Programmers retain program source code in their personal files until users have signed off on it, which increases the likelihood that it might not be backed up adequately or that crucial portions of it might not be locatable when a programmer is absent.
c. Programmers may modify software after it has been authorized by users, which increases the likelihood of unauthorized code being run.
d. Programmers test programs as they see fit, which means that testing may not be adequate to detect errors that affect production systems.
e. Programs implemented by emergency procedures are not subsequently subjected to standard acceptance procedures.
f. Vendor-supplied software is loaded directly into the production library without testing, which increases the likelihood of running faulty programs.
g. No one coordinates acquisition of microcomputer software, which could result in incompatible data files and reports and increase the difficulty of NYCCC providing necessary support to users.
Software Implemented in the Regions
For software implemented in the regions, program development and change control are weak because:
a. Programs are not tested at a regional office prior to implementation, and no parallel testing is performed.
b. Distribution of new or modified programs is haphazard, which could result in different regions running different versions or a region never implementing a program.
c. Regional personnel only receive training via written instructions, which may be insufficient for correct use of a program.
Internal Audit Involvement in System Development
The failure of internal audit to be involved in system development means that the company is not taking advantage of an opportunity for internal audit to monitor the progress and effectiveness of system development. The implied reason for the hands-off policy is to maintain auditor independence, but auditors can maintain their independence and still conduct audits of system development.
Program Development. What new or improved control procedures would reduce or eliminate these weaknesses?
Software Developed at NYCCC. Regional users should participate in system development during project selection, system design, and testing evaluation. A program library should be established for systems under development. Change control procedures for program modifications should be implemented. Program testing should be designed to test all program requirements. Program changes made under emergency conditions should undergo testing and approval within 24 hours of implementation. Vendor-supplied software should be tested before implementation. Acquisition of microcomputer software should be coordinated to the extent necessary to decrease the likelihood of incompatible systems.
Software Implemented in the Regions. Programs should be tested in the regional environment before implementation. Version control should be implemented for applications software to ensure that the correct versions of application software are used. The effectiveness of training in the use of new programs should be assured.
Internal Audit Involvement in System Development. Internal audit should be involved in system development to monitor the progress and effectiveness of system development. 
At Local Offices
At local offices, there is less separation of duties than is necessary given the number of employees. Practices may not be consistent across offices, and all employees may not be well trained. Because disbursement transactions originate in local offices, all financial statement assertions regarding inventory, accounts payable, and cost of goods sold are threatened. Because the originating office has no review responsibility, accuracy of transaction entry is threatened.
At Regional Offices
At regional offices, the incompatible functions of authorizing and recording of transactions are not well separated. A weakness in authorization is that regions never inform the local offices of invoices paid, which means that local offices do not know whether vendors are paid for goods and could not identify unauthorized payments to vendors. The computer program that accepts transactions does not perform sufficient data validation. A weakness over completeness of transactions sent to regional offices is that purchase orders and receiving reports are faxed or mailed from the local offices with no confirmation of receipt. Completeness of transaction initiation for transmission to NYCCC is also weak because a review of the file for unpaid but received goods is not made often. Completeness of transactions transmitted between the regions and NYCCC is stronger although there is no procedure for detecting and restarting failed transmissions. Additionally, there are no controls regarding the security of transmissions. Discrepancy resolutions are generally undocumented, and there are no standard procedures for resolution. Although the actual practice may be typical, the lack of documentation is inconsistent with strong control.
At NYCCC
Because there is no automated procedure for preventing duplicate payments, it is possible for a vendor to receive duplicate payments. There is no separation of duties between personnel that authorize invoices for payment, print checks, and disburse them. Because there is only limited review of suspended transactions, some payments may be incomplete or not made timely. Because local office personnel, who know what goods they received, are not involved in payment procedures at NYCCC, transaction entry at NYCCC may be incomplete, inaccurate, or unauthorized. Because neither operations nor users log processing failures, errors in transaction processing could result in data loss, data inaccuracies, or processing inefficiencies.
Transaction Processing. What new or improved control procedures would reduce or eliminate these weaknesses?
At Local Offices. More effective separation of duties should be implemented, e.g., the local office manager taking a more active role in supervising the administrative function, particularly in authorizing purchase orders. Local offices should inform the regional office of the numbers of purchase orders and receiving reports they send to the regional office so that the regional office can verify that all of them are received. Local offices should have a means of confirming whether vendors have been paid.
At Regional Offices. The duties of authorizing and recording transactions should be separated more cleanly. Regions should have a means of confirming whether vendors have been paid. To improve data validation, the functions of entering purchase order transactions and entering new vendors and inventory items should be separated. Regions should inform NYCCC of the number of invoices they transmit to NYCCC so that NYCCC can verify that all transmitted invoices are received. Because of the vulnerability of transmissions, hash totals for invoices transmitted should be communicated. Discrepancy resolution procedures should be documented and followed uniformly.
At NYCCC. An automated review for duplicate payments should be implemented. The incompatible functions of authorizing payment, printing checks, and disbursing checks should be separated.
The review of suspended transactions should be performed periodically and thoroughly enough to ensure that payments are made timely. Records should be kept sufficient to ensure that transactions involved in processing failures are recovered. 3. Liabilities and assets may be misstated. a. Lack of coordination for the loading of program changes and lack of testing of program changes at regional offices may result in inaccurate processing or processing that is inconsistent between regional offices.
b. Due to lack of training at the regional and local offices, accounting procedures may be applied erroneously and control procedures may not be applied consistently.
c. Because control procedures at the regional offices are not reviewed or tested by internal or, presumably, external audi tors, those procedures cannot be relied upon for any degree of assurance over any transactions. Therefore, the creation of purchase orders, receiving reports, invoices, and authorization of vendors can only be assessed as not controlled.
4. Assets may be misstated. a. Lack of separation of duties at a local office may result in collusion between someone in that office and a vendor. This could result in payment for goods not received or the purchase of goods not needed. Unneeded inventory must often be written down or off.
b. Local offices do not receive information regarding transactions processed on their behalf. This may result in theft by employees at regional offices, who could enter fictitious purchases. Because they can also presumably enter fictitious vendors, payment addresses may be invalid. Limited access control over regional office computers exacerbates this problem.
c. NYCCC may have the ability to create fictitious invoices and vendors, resulting in the same type of theft as described above.
5. Liabilities may be understated. a. Either local or regional offices may delay reporting of liabilities for significant lengths of time. This may be advantageous to the computation of their performance measures.
6. Liabilities and assets may be misstated. a. Programmers have the capability to make program changes without detection. Therefore, unauthorized commands may be inserted in programs that could facilitate theft. 12. Adjustments to payables are recorded accurately and timely.
-
The auditor is unlikely to test control activities for any of the assertions because of weaknesses in internal control pertaining to physical and logical access, program development, and transaction processing as explained in questions 1-3 above. ________________ a No control activities were explained in the Apex narrative that address the assertions of (1) rights and obligations or (2) presentation and disclosure.
